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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has asked the 
Public Utilities Subcommittee (subcommittee) of the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants for its views on certain accounting 
issues that have emerged recently in the public utility industry 
relating principally to the construction, operation, and abandonment 
of nuclear generating facilities. The subcommittee has addressed those 
issues in this paper in a question and answer format. The subcommit-
tee's conclusions are based on the guidance provided in present 
authoritative accounting pronouncements, primarily FASB Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 71 , Accounting for the Effects of 
Certain Types of Regulation (SFAS 71). 
The FASB should reconsider two significant characteristics that 
are relevant to public utility rate-making and related financial 
reporting in deciding whether existing pronouncements, including SFAS 
71 , provide adequate accounting guidance to address the emerging 
issues discussed in this paper. Those characteristics are the 
following: 
• Assets created by rate actions of a regulator are in effect 
long-term receivables from customers which should be carried 
at their discounted present value to reflect the complete 
economic effects of rate-making. 
• Shareholders' equity is considered to have a cost for utility 
rate-making purposes. 
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Discounted Present Value 
Rate actions of a regulator can provide reasonable assurance of 
the existence of an asset. Paragraph 9 of SFAS 71 sets forth criteria 
for capitalizing all or part of an incurred cost that would otherwise 
be charged to expense. The economic value of such an asset depends on 
whether it is recoverable and whether it will or will not be included 
in rate base and earn a return. When the FASB concluded in 
paragraphs 33 and 34 of SFAS 71 that deferred costs that were not 
earning a return during the cost recovery period should not be 
recorded at discounted present value, the amounts involved were less 
significant. Recently, cost deferrals involve substantial amounts for 
man y utilities. 
The subcommittee believes that by following the guidance in SFAS 
71 , the complete economic effects of rate-making are not reflected in 
the financial statements of public utilities unless discounting to 
present value is required for costs not earning a current return that 
are deferred pursuant to paragraph 9 of SFAS 71. Such cost deferrals 
are in effect long-term receivables from utility customers for which 
there is no stated interest rate. Therefore, the concept for 
discounting to present value as required by APB Opinion No. 21, 
Interest on Receivables and Payables, should be applicable. 
Equity Has A Cost 
Although footnote 1 of SFAS 71 describes the term allowable costs 
as including "amounts provided for earnings on shareholders' 
investments," current accounting practice, including that used by 
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public utilities, does not reflect preferred stock costs (dividends) 
and return to common shareholders as a cost in the income statement. 
The rate-making process provides for a rate of return to be applied to 
the rate base (allowable investment) in order that the regulated 
enterprise can recover its cost of capital. The rate of return is 
ordinarily a weighted composite of the imbedded (rather than current) 
cost of debt, the dividend cost of preferred stock, and a return on 
common equity. Various measures and mechanisms are used to determine 
the rate of return on common equity, but the allowed amount is usually 
considered to represent the cost of common equity. Under current 
generally accepted accounting principles, preferred dividends and 
return on common equity are not considered a cost, while the return on 
debt (interest) is clearly a cost. Although the subcommittee believes 
that the return on equity is a cost in an economic and rate-making 
sense, the subcommittee recognizes that the FASB has not accepted 
these amounts as an operating expense for accounting or reporting pur-
poses (for example, SFAS 34, Capitalization of Interest) for either 
regulated or nonregulated enterprises. 
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Further, the subcommittee notes that in making an asset impair-
ment evaluation in accordance with paragraph 10 of SFAS 71, the cost 
of equity is not considered when determining if there is total cost 
recovery associated with an operating asset. Only interest costs can 
be considered under generally accepted accounting principles, as such 
costs are reflected as costs in the income statement by both regulated 
and nonregulated enterprises. The subcommittee recommends that the 
FASB consider whether equity is a cost which must be considered in 
making an impairment evaluation for both regulated and nonregulated 
enterprises. If the FASB were to conclude that equity is a cost that 
should be included in making an asset impairment evaluation, an imme-
diate charge to expense of an amount up to the amount of the costs 
disallowed by a regulator would be required. 
* * * * 
Recommended FASB Actions 
Summarized below are additional matters that the subcommittee 
believes the FASB should clarify or address in any revisions to SFAS 
71 . 
Definition of Probable 
The probability of future recovery of allowable costs is a key 
factor that public utilities that are regulated on a cost of service 
basis consider in resolving most accounting issues. The FASB in SFAS 
5, Accounting for Contingencies, paragraph 3(a), defined probable in 
the following manner: 
The future event or events are likely to occur 
[emphasis added]. 
Whereas, footnote 6 of SFAS 71 states: 
The term probable is used in this Statement with its usual 
general meaning, rather than in a specific technical sense, 
and refers to that which can reasonably be expected or 
believed on the basis of available evidence or logic but is 
neither certain nor proved. 
- 4 -
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Some have concluded that there is a significant difference in these 
definitions, specifically the standard in SFAS 71 is much Less 
demanding than the one in SFAS 5. They have interpreted the defini-
tion in SFAS 71 to mean a "50/50 chance" of occurrence. As discussed 
further in Issue III, the subcommittee does not agree with such 
conclusions and believes the FASB should clarify the probability stan-
dard so that recovery of costs, as provided in paragraph 9 of SFAS 71, 
are evaluated using SFAS 5 criteria. 
Furthermore, subparagraph 5(c) of SFAS 71 introduces the term it 
is reasonable to assume, which may be interpreted as being even less 
demanding than either of the two definitions of probable. The subcom-
mittee recommends that the term probable, as finally defined by the 
FASB, be substituted for "it is reasonable to assume." 
Criteria for Evaluating Cost Recovery 
Subparagraph 5(c) of SFAS 71 requires that an evaluation be 
made to determine whether rates set at levels that will recover the 
enterprises costs can be charged to and collected from customers 
during the recovery period for any capitalized costs based upon anti-
cipated changes in levels of demand or competition. Such an eva-
luation is extremely difficult to perform in practice and the creation 
of various phase-in plans, as described further under Issue III, adds 
to the complexity of such an assessment. Elasticity of customer 
demand, monopoly implications, general economic conditions, changes in 
the degree and style of regulation, and the political outlook are fac-
tors to be considered in assessing existing and future competition. 
- 5 -
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The current economic and political environment in many regulated 
industries is toward increased competition and deregulation. As 
discussed under Issue III, SFAS 71 provides no guidelines to assess 
the potential for recovering costs deferred pursuant to the criteria 
set forth in paragraph 9 of SFAS 71 or for that matter related to any 
capitalized asset. In addition to the change in the definition of 
probable as previously recommended, the subcommittee believes that the 
FASB should adopt guidelines, such as those listed under Issue III 
and/or otherwise provide a substantial amount of guidance to assist 
the regulators, the regulated enterprises and the accounting pro-
fession in determining whether the criterion in subparagraph 5(c) is 
met. 
Deferral of an Equity Return 
As discussed under Issue III, some phase-in plans and excess 
capacity determinations provide for the deferral of a return on share-
holders' equity, which under conventional rate-making would be realized 
currently. Although SFAS 71 contains a specific standard that makes 
it appropriate to capitalize an allowance for funds used during 
construction (AFUDC), SFAS 71 contains no such specific standard for 
capitalizing or not capitalizing an allowance for funds used during 
operations (when not realized currently). The subcommittee believes 
the FASB should address this issue and establish formal authoritative 
support through a specific standard in SFAS 71 for capitalizing an 
allowance for funds used during operations. In addition, the subcom-
mittee believes that the terra incurred costs in paragraph 9 of SFAS 71 
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should be clarified to provide for capitalization of equity costs 
that would otherwise be earned currently, if future recovery is pro-
bable. 
Criteria for Continued Capitalization of AFUDC 
Paragraphs 15 and 82 through 84 of SFAS 71 provide no guidance 
relating to the accounting for AFUDC in situations where it is pro-
bable that there will be a future disallowance of costs associated 
with an asset that will become operational. The subcommittee 
believes that the FASB should expand the specific standard relating to 
AFUDC in paragraph 15 of SFAS 71 and incorporate the subcommittee's 
views as described in the answer to question 4 relating to Issue II. 
Transition Guidelines 
As discussed under Issue IV question 3, no guidance for tran-
sition is provided in SFAS 71 if that statement no longer applies to 
an enterprise because it no longer meets all the criteria of paragraph 
5. The subcommittee believes that the FASB should provide such 
guidance. 
Accounting for Nuclear Plane Decommissioning Costs 
The subcomittee has decided to limit the topics included in chis 
paper to significant recent developments affecting regulated enterpri-
ses (such as, phase-in plans and plant abandonments) and to exclude 
questions relating to the initial implementation of SFAS 71 in 
existing circumstances. Questions concerning the appropriate 
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accounting for nuclear plant decommissioning costs are an example of 
such implementation issues that have not been addressed in this paper. 
However, the subcommittee considers nuclear plant decommissioning 
costs to be a significant issue and believes that the FASB should con-
sider providing additional accounting and disclosure guidance in 
accounting for decommissioning costs. 
The subcommittee believes that paragraph 80 of SFAS 71 makes it 
clear that plant decommissioning costs are incurred costs that should 
be charged against income as the plant is used, whether or not the 
regulator allows such charges to be recovered from customers 
currently. The subcommittee also believes that estimated total decom-
missioning costs should be based upon the specific enterprise's 
expected decommissioning methodology, such as dismantling or moth 
balling. Decommissioning costs allocated to the current period for 
accounting purposes that are not being recovered from customers in 
rates may be deferred if the criteria in paragraph 9 of SFAS 71 are 
met. 
The subcommittee also believes that the potential magnitude of 
decommissioning costs and the uncertainties inherent in estimating 
such costs necessitate additional financial statement disclosures such 
as the following: 
• Total estimated decommissioning costs to be incurred (in 
today's dollars) including date that cost estimate was last 
made and key assumptions used 
• Expected timing of decommissioning activities 
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Method for collecting costs from customers and amounts 
collected from customers to date and costs "incurred" 
• Tax implications, if any 
• Cash flow aspects of decommissioning activities, including 
any restrictions on funds collected from customers 
Additional guidance by the FASB in the following areas would be 
helpful in resolving many of the questions concerning decommissioning 
costs: 
1. Is the entire liability for decommissioning costs incurred on 
the date a nuclear plant is placed in service or is the 
liability incurred over the plant's useful life? 
The subcommittee believes that if the entire liability is 
recognized at the in-service date, an offsetting entry should 
be made to record a deferred charge, to be allocated to 
future periods. 
2. Should plant decommissioning costs be recorded as an offset 
to the plant account or as a liability? 
Although the subcommittee believes that decommissioning costs 
meet the definition of a liability, there are precedents for 
contra asset treatment of similar items, such as strip-mining 
reclamation costs. 
3. Should the estimate of future decommissioning costs consider 
possible inflation, its discounted present value, and future 
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technological and regulatory changes or should such estimates 
be based strictly on current costs and requirements? 
The subcommittee believes that as a practical matter the 
effects of possible inflation and discounting to present 
value would tend to offset each other and that the cost esti-
mates should be based upon current technology. 
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ISSUE I -- PLANT ABANDONMENTS 
Background 
A substancial number of electric utilities have decided to aban-
don generating facilities that were under construction (plant abandon-
ments), and other utilities are considering such abandonments. 
A number of the utilities have disclosed construction delays of 
plants and the possibility of an abandonment decision. The principal 
reasons cited for the delays included inadequate rate relief and 
corresponding lack of funds, delays in project approvals by regulatory 
agencies, reductions in projected sales growth, and higher construc-
tion quality requirements. 
Plant abandonment decisions have been made or are under con-
sideration for plants ranging from the early stages of construction to 
those nearing completion. Several nuclear plant abandonment decisions 
were announced by utilities in 1984 for plants that were nearing 
completion. Costs associated with nuclear plant abandonments in the 
electric utility industry aggregate many billions of dollars. 
Relatively small amounts were associated with plant abandonment 
decisions at the time the FASB determined that deferring such costs 
was appropriate if it was probable that a regulator would allow reco-
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very in future revenue by amortization of the amounts in cost of ser-
vice for rate-making purposes. 
Guidance for deferring the costs of abandoned plants for 
accounting purposes is provided in paragraph 9 of SFAS 71, and 
paragraph 20 sets forth the disclosure requirements if the unamortized 
balance of such a deferral does not earn a return on investment during 
the recovery period. The principal thrust of SFAS 71 is that the eco-
nomics of rate-making be reflected in the financial statements of 
regulated enterprises. However, paragraphs 33 and 34 of SFAS 71 indi-
cate that the FASB chose to differentiate between capitalized costs 
not earning a rate of return from those earning a rate of return by 
requiring disclosure rather than recording at discounted present 
value. Hence, although the regulator's actions create the basis for 
recording the cost of an abandoned plant as an asset, the complete 
economic effect of the regulator's decision are not reflected, but 
only disclosed when the asset is not allowed to earn a return on 
investment during the recovery period. 
For rate-making purposes, exclusion of an asset from the rate 
base has the effect of eliminating rate recovery of associated ongoing 
interest costs, preferred stock dividends, and return to common share-
holders. SFAS 71 does not address the fact that the weighted average 
rate of return on rate base granted by regulators is intended to 
recover the aforementioned elements. Hence, it must be concluded that 
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these elements are regarded as costs that need only be recorded as 
incurred and do not need to be considered in evaluating the recovery 
of costs capitalized pursuant to paragraph 9 of SFAS 71. Under 
current accounting practice for both regulated and nonregulated 
enterprises, preferred stock dividends and return to common share-
holders are not recorded as costs in the income statement. Costs that 
would be charged to expense, absent the regulator's rate action that 
provides probability of the recovery of the cost of an asset, are 
intangible in nature and obtain value as an asset only from a regula-
tor's promise of future revenue to permit recovery. 
Some regulators take a position that losses resulting from plant 
abandonments should be borne entirely by the consumers. This is 
accomplished when the regulator allows amortization of the loss in cost 
of service in establishing future rates for a specified number of 
years and allows a rate of return on the unamortized balance. Some 
regulators believe there should be a sharing between the consumers and 
the shareholders of losses resulting from plane abandonments. The 
most common way to achieve this is to allow amortization of the loss 
in cosc of service in escablishing fucure races for a specified number 
of years but not allow a rate of return on the unamortized balance. 
As indicated previously, the only accounting or financial 
reporting difference between the two scenarios described in the pre-
ceeding paragraph is that in the latter case disclosure is required of 
amounts deferred on which a return on investment is not allowed by the 
regulator and the remaining recovery period applicable to them, if 
material. 
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Another method regulators have used for sharing such losses is to 
disallow a portion of the plant abandonment loss from any recovery but 
allow cost recovery of the remaining portion, as well as a rate of 
return thereon (see Issue I, Question 3). 
Construction activity is usually suspended, often for an extended 
period of time, prior to a final decision to abandon or to resume 
construction. The principal accounting question is whether and for 
how long AFUDC and other costs, for example, real estate taxes, should 
be capitalized. Current practice varies considerably. 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Accounting 
Release No. AR5 issued in 1968 states: "No interest should be accrued 
during period of interrupted construction unless the company can 
justify the interruption as being reasonable under the circumstances." 
The FERC has decided administratively that AFUDC should not be capita-
lized if the period of suspended construction is longer than two 
years; it readily accepts capitalization if the period is one year or 
less. 
SFAS 34 deals with the interest capitalization period for 
enterprises in general. SFAS 34 refers to the capitalization period 
for nonregulated enterprises in paragraphs 17 and 19 as follows: 
17. The capitalization period shall begin when three conditions 
are present: 
a. Expenditures (as defined in paragraph 16 [of this 
statement]) for the asset have been made. 
b. Activities that are necessary to get the asset ready for 
its intended use are in progress. 
c. Interest cost is being incurred. 
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Interest capitalization shall continue as long as those three 
conditions are present. The term activities is to be 
construed broadly. It encompasses more than physical 
construction; it includes all the steps required to prepare 
the asset for its intended use. For example, it includes 
administrative and technical activities during the pre-
construction stage, such as the development of plans or the 
process of obtaining permits from governmental authorities; 
it includes activities undertaken after construction has 
begun in order to overcome unforeseen obstacles, such as 
technical problems, labor disputes, or litigation. If the 
enterprise suspends substantially all activities related to 
acquisition of the asset, interest capitalization shall cease 
until activities are resumed. However, brief interruptions 
in activities, interruptions that are externally imposed, and 
delays that are inherent in the asset acquisition process 
shall not require cessation of interest capitalization. 
19. Interest capitalization shall not cease when present 
accounting principles require recognition of a lower value 
for the asset than acquisition cost; the provision required 
to reduce acquisition cost to such lower value shall be 
increased appropriately [emphasis added]. 
The extent of detail and the location of the disclosure relating 
to interrupted construction vary between enterprises and within an 
enterprise from period to period as the enterprise moves through 
its decision-making process. 
Generally, no write-offs or write-downs of carrying value are 
made prior to reaching a final decision to abandon the plant. A 
number of auditors' "subject to" opinions were issued on 1983 finan-
cial statements because of the uncertainty associated with potential 
plant abandonments. Several utilities stopped accruing AFUDC in 1984 
before making a final decision to abandon the project. 
A long period of time may elapse from the date an abandonment 
decision is reached until the regulator indicates whether and how the 
abandonment loss will be allowable for rate-making purposes. Under 
generally accepted accounting principles for nonregulated enterprises, 
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an abandonment decision would require an immediate loss recognition of 
the difference between the carrying value of the asset plus estimated 
cancellation charges less salvage value. Paragraph 9 of SFAS 71 states 
that rate actions of a regulator can provide reasonable assurance of 
the existence of an asset. As explained in paragraph 76 of SFAS 71, 
paragraph 9 refers to costs that normally would be charged to expense 
by a nonregulated enterprise. Generally, if management of a public 
utility intends to pursue complete cost recovery of the cost of aban-
doned plants, no write-offs or write-downs of carrying value have been 
made prior to the determination of the rate treatment by the regula-
tor. This approach is taken because the loss, if any, cannot be 
reasonably estimated in advance as required by subparagraph 8(b) of 
SFAS 5, the minimum loss within the range of possible loss is zero, 
and in accordance with FASB Interpretation No. 14, Reasonable 
Estimation of the Amount of a Loss, paragraph 3, no loss provision is 
required. In situations where utilities did not pursue rate recovery 
of abandonment losses, the losses were recognized in the period the 
decision not to seek recovery was made. 
Present practice varies as to where and how disclosure is made in 
financial statements, annual reports, and SEC Forms 10-K of the uncer-
tainty as to whether and how the abandonment loss will be recognized 
for rate-making purposes. Where uncertainty exists and the amount is 
material, the independent auditors ordinarily would issue a "subject 
to" opinion. 
QUESTION 1 : Under what circumstances should plant abandonment losses 
be deferred for financial reporting purposes? 
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Conclusion of the Subcommittee 
Plant abandonment losses should be deferred for financial 
reporting purposes when a regulator intends to allow at least recovery 
of cost, including the capitalized cost of financing construction 
activities (AFUDC), and such costs can be recovered. Paragraph 9 of 
SFAS 71 provides guidance for the establishment of an asset in such 
situations. Paragraph 20 of SFAS 71 requires that the utility 
disclose the remaining amounts of such assets, if material, if the 
recovery of the costs is provided without a return on investment 
during the recovery period and the remaining recovery period appli-
cable to those assets. 
Although paragraph 92 of SFAS 71 could be interpreted to permit 
carrying certain assets at their discounted present value, paragraph 
34 prohibits the costs from being recorded at discounted present 
value. The subcommittee notes that paragraph 34 is contained in 
Appendix B, which provides guidance for the application of SFAS 71 to 
specific situations; whereas paragraph 92 is contained in Appendix C, 
which discusses factors considered by the FASB in arriving at the 
conclusions contained in the Statement itself and Appendix B. 
Therefore, the subcommittee has concluded that paragraph 34 governs 
and that discounting to present value is not permitted. 
The subcommittee believes that the complete economic effects of 
rate-making are not reflected in the financial statements of public 
utilities because deferred charges, such as plant abandonment losses, 
are not required to be discounted when no return is allowed for rate-
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making purposes. The subcommittee believes that such assets created 
by regulation are, in effect, long-term receivables from customers, 
and as such require discounting to present value. APB Opinion No. 21, 
Interest on Receivables and Payables, requires discounting to present 
value of long-term receivables on which there is no stated interest 
rate. The discount rate could be based on the weighted average cost 
of debt for the enterprise or the allowed weighted average rate of 
return used in the latest rate case of the enterprise. 
QUESTION 2: If a regulator does not allow a plant abandonment loss to 
be recovered through inclusion in cost of service over a 
future period must the loss be recognized in the 
current reporting period? 
Conclusion of the Subcommittee 
In most circumstances, the plant abandonment loss should be 
recognized in the current reporting period if it is not allowed as a 
cost of service in establishing future rates. The subcommittee has 
concluded, in accordance with paragraph 9(a) of SFAS 71, that cost 
recovery of an abandoned plant may be accomplished indirectly even 
though the regulatory process does not provide for the recovery of the 
plant abandonment loss through amortization in cost of service, pro-
vided that the regulator's intent was to provide recovery through some 
other means and the amount of recovery is measurable. For example, if 
it can be established that the weighted average rate of return allowed 
on assets included in the rate base will be measurably higher than it 
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would have been absent the disallowance of the abandonment loss, then 
the incremental weighted average rate of return can be considered to 
be the mechanism for the recovery of the plant abandonment loss, and 
the entire loss need not be recognized in the current reporting 
period. If a direct linkage and regulatory intent cannot be 
established to indicate that the costs associated with the abandonment 
will be recovered in future periods, the costs must be written off in 
the current reporting period. This linkage must be re-established in 
each succeeding rate case. The subcommittee believes that situations 
where direct linkage and regulatory intent can be established will be 
rare. As stated previously, the amount should be discounted to pre-
sent value. 
QUESTION 3: If a regulator does not allow a portion of a plant aban-
donment loss to be recovered through inclusion in cost 
of service in future periods, must the loss on the 
portion disallowed be recognized in the current reporting 
period? 
Conclusion of the Subcommittee 
Some regulators are alleging that some utilities should have 
decided sooner than they did on a cancellation or that there were 
inefficiencies in connection with the construction costs accumulated 
prior to the decision to abandon. Frequently, in such cases, the 
regulator may do either of the following: 
1. Disallow a portion of the cost of the abandoned plant and 
allow the remainder to be recovered in cost of service in 
establishing future rates for a specified number of years and 
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not allow rate base treatment and a rate of return on the 
unamortized balance of the portion allowed in cost of ser-
vice 
2. Disallow a portion of the cost of the abandoned plant and 
allow the remainder to be recovered in cost of service in 
establishing future rates for a specified number of years and 
allow a rate of return on the unamortized balance of the por-
tion allowed through rate base treatment 
If the regulator makes a partial disallowance as described in (1) 
above, the disallowed portion should be written off in the period the 
regulator makes the determination or any earlier period if it is pro-
bable that disallowance will result and it can be quantified. The 
allowed portion would be deferred and amortized over the period 
designated by the regulator, and disclosed in the notes to the finan-
cial statements. The subcommittee believes that the amount should be 
discounted to present value. 
If the regulator makes a partial disallowance as described in (2) 
above and the regulator does not intend to attribute all or a portion 
of the return on the allowed portion to the recovery of the cost of 
the disallowed portion, the subcommittee believes that the disallowed 
portion should be written off in the current reporting period. An 
indication of such intent would be an accounting order by the regula-
tor that the disallowed amount should be written off. 
Some, nevertheless, may argue that the currently allowed return 
on the portion of the loss allowed in the rate base should be con-
sidered recovery of the portion of the loss not allowed in cost of 
service. The subcommittee believes that intent of the regulator and 
linkage, as discussed in Issue I, question 2, are required to support 
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such a position because the costs associated with plant abandonments 
are "intangibles" and should be written off in the current reporting 
period absent a regulator's promise to allow recovery. Establishing 
such linkage and intent may be difficult, and they must be re-
established in each succeeding rate case. As stated previously, the 
subcommittee believes that the amount should be discounted to present 
value. 
If the required linkage and intent can be established and 
deferral of abandonment losses is deemed appropriate, paragraph 20 of 
SFAS 71 requires disclosure of amounts deferred that are not earning a 
return (up to the entire abandonment amount in such circumstances 
because some or all of the rate of return on the allowed portion is 
considered to be the recovery of the cost of the disallowed portion). 
If the return allowed on the allowed portion is insufficient to 
recover all the disallowed costs, a write-off in the current reporting 
period of a portion of the disallowed portion would be necessary. 
QUESTION 4: What are the accounting implications and disclosure 
requirements from the time a utility considers a plant 
abandonment to the time a final decision to abandon (or 
resume construction) is reached? 
Conclusion of the Subcommittee 
The subcommittee believes that a determination should be made as 
to whether and for how long AFUDC and other costs should continue to 
be capitalized for each suspended construction project based upon the 
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individual circumstances. SFAS 34 provides authoritative accounting 
guidance with respect to the continuing capitalization of interest 
costs. In addition, the FERC administrative policies dealing with 
this issue, although arbitrary, also serve as a useful guide. One of 
the most important factors to be considered in determining the 
accounting treatment and disclosure requirements is the anticipated 
treatment of the abandonment for rate-making purposes by the regulator 
if a decision to abandon is ultimately made, including the regulator's 
policy on recognition of AFUDC and other costs capitalized during a 
suspension period. 
The subcommittee also believes the extent and location of the 
required financial statement disclosures during the period construc-
tion is suspended pending a final decision will vary between companies 
and over time within companies. The amount of money invested in plant 
construction in relation to the financial statements as a whole, as 
well as the effect of established rate precedent, obviously indicates 
the significance of any potential loss. When the circumstances indi-
cate that an abandonment decision is possible and incomplete recovery 
of associated costs is possible, the following should be disclosed in 
the notes to the financial statements: 
• Amounts expended to date (and amount of AFUDC included 
therein) plus estimated cancellation charges 
• Percentage completed 
• Whether AFUDC and other costs are continuing to be capita-
lized and, if so, the amount on a continuing basis 
• Expected regulatory treatment, if abandoned, and precedent 
therefor 
- 2 2 -
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• Worst case scenario (that is if plant is abandoned and no 
regulatory relief is granted, the effect on net income and 
equity, including the possibility of being in default under 
indenture provisions, etc.) 
The management discussion and analysis (MD&A) contained in the annual 
report should address cash flow implications including the ability to 
continue to pay dividends (see Issue I, question 5). 
QUESTION 5: What are the accounting and disclosure requirements from 
the time a final abandonment decision is reached until 
the time the regulator determines the treatment for rate-
making purposes? 
Conclusion of the Subcommittee 
The subcommittee believes that the enterprise's management should 
conduct a comprehensive ongoing review to determine whether abandon-
ment costs should be written off or written down. The review should 
include a thorough evaluation of the anticipated rate treatment by the 
regulator and any changes in the regulatory environment (for example, 
changes in commissioners, changes in statutes, etc.). SFAS 71, 
paragraph 9, provides that the dictionary definition of probable be 
used in the probability assessment. The subcommittee notes that that 
definition may be construed to be less stringent than the criteria set 
forth in SFAS 5. The subcommittee believes that the probability cri-
teria should be modified and clarified by the FASB so that recovery of 
costs, as provided in paragraph 9 of SFAS 71, are evaluated using SFAS 
5 criteria. 
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The subcommittee believes that the uncertainty during this time 
lag period should be disclosed in a note to the financial statements. 
For guidance as to the extent of the disclosure see Issue I, question 
4. 
Whether an auditor would issue a "subject to" opinion on the 
financial statements will depend on whether the amount of the abandon-
ment loss, if subsequently determined by the regulator not to be 
allowed for rate-making purposes, is material in relation to not 
income and the equity of the enterprise and whether the enterprise's 
dividend paying ability would be affected. If nonrecovery of the 
abandonment loss would jeopardize the financial viability of the com-
pany, a "going concern" opinion may be required. Guidance concerning 
materiality is set forth in an interpretation of Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 2, Reports on Audited Financial Statements, issued by 
the AICPA Auditing Standards Board in October 1979. 
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ISSUE II -- DISALLOWANCE OF A 
PORTION OF COSTS ASSOCIATED 
WITH AN OPERATING PLANT 
Background 
There have been recent instances where regulators have disallowed 
a portion of the cost of major generating projects which have been 
completed and placed in service, from inclusion in the rate base 
and/or from recovery through cost of service by reducing allowable 
depreciation. Among the reasons cited for the disallowance have been 
allegations that: 
• Significant cost overruns should not be borne entirely by 
the rate payer 
• Imprudent expenditures or construction mismanagment by the 
company 
• The plant represents excess capacity which is not needed to 
serve customers 
• The construction period was excessive, leading to excessive 
AFUDC or inflated costs 
• Rates set on the basis of the recovery of all costs would 
place too great a burden on customers or cannot be economi-
cally recoverable 
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Alternatively, regulators may "penalize" the utility by reducing 
the rate of return otherwise allowable on the cost of the plane (or 
the entire base). 
The accounting question is whether the actions described above 
require a write-down in the carrying amount of the operating plant. 
Paragraph 10 of SFAS 71 refers to a regulator excluding all or part of 
a cost from allowable costs in current and future periods, thereby not 
providing for recovery in revenues. For that situation, the carrying 
amount is to be reduced "to the extent that the asset has been 
impaired. Whether the asset has been impaired shall be judged the 
same as for enterprises in general." Therefore, in order to determine 
whether a write-down of a regulated enterprise's long-lived assets is 
required, the appropriate accounting for "enterprises in general" in 
similar circumstances must be determined. This is difficult to do. 
Generally accepted accounting principles provide little specific 
guidance for accounting for impairment of value of assets with long 
useful lives. This lack of specific guidance was acknowledged in 1977 
by the FASB in SFAS 19, Financial Accounting and Reporting by Oil 
and Gas Producing Companies, paragraph 209, which states: 
The question of whether to write-down the carrying amount of pro-
ductive assets to an amount expected to be recoverable through 
future use of those assets is unsettled under present generally 
accepted accounting principles. This is a pervasive issue that 
the Board has not addressed. 
An issues paper prepared by the AICPA Accounting Standards 
Division Task Force on Impairment of Value entitled Accounting for 
the Inability to Fully Recover the Carrying Amount of Long-Lived 
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Assets, dated July 15, 1980 (Appendix B), recommended that asset 
impairment should be reflected in the financial statements. However, 
the FASB has taken no action as a result of that paper. The paper 
indicated that impairment write-downs have been rare in practice. 
There are general references in accounting literature relating to 
the accounting for the "impairment of the value of an asset," however, 
write-downs have been rare in practice. The following references are 
applicable: 
• Section M-5C of Chapter 7 of APB Statement No. 4, Basic 
Concepts and Accounting Principles Underlying Financial 
Statements of Business Enterprises, states: 
In unusual circumstances persuasive evidence may exist of 
impairment of the utility of productive facilities indica-
tive of an inability to recover costs although the facili-
ties have not become worthless. The amount at which those 
facilities are carried is sometimes reduced to recoverable 
costs and a loss recorded prior to disposition or expiration 
of the useful life of the facilities. 
• Paragraphs 74 and 75 of SFAS 5, state: 
74. The accrual of some loss contingencies may result in 
recording the impairment of the value of an asset 
rather than in recording a liability, for example, 
accruals for expropriation of assets or uncollectible 
receivables. Accounting presently recognizes impair-
ments of value of assets such as the following: 
...e) Paragraph 183 of APB Statement No. 4 (Section 
1027.09) states that when enterprise assets are 
damaged by others, asset amounts are written down to 
recoverable costs and a loss is recorded. [emphasis 
added] . 
75. A recurring principle underlying all of these referen-
ces to asset impairments in accounting literature is 
that a loss should not be accrued until it is probable 
that an asset has been impaired and the amount of the 
loss can be reasonably estimated. As indicated by 
those references, impairment is recognized, for 
instance, when a non-temporary decline in the market 
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price of marketable securities below cost has taken 
place, when the utility of inventory is no longer as 
great as its cost, when a commitment, in terras of a 
formal plan, has been made to abandon a segment of a 
business or to sell a segment at less than its carrying 
amount, when enterprise assets are damaged, and so 
forth. ... 
It is clear in authoritative literature that cost recovery is the 
key criteria to be used in making an impairment evaluation of 
long-lived assets. 
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 3, Elements of 
Financial Statements of Business Enterprises (SFAC 3) , defines one of 
the characteristics of an asset as: 
It embodies a probable future benefit that involves a capa-
city, singly or in combination with other assets, to contri-
bute directly or indirectly to future net cash inflows. 
SFAC 3 further defines that an asset must have "service potential for 
future economic benefit." 
By itself, a disallowed cost for rate-making purposes associated with 
a long-lived operating asset provides no future economic benefits or 
cash inflow but in combination with all of the other related costs of 
the plant, it may produce revenues sufficient to recover all of the 
costs of providing the service including the disallowed costs. 
Some believe that SFAS 71 requires that utilities report the eco-
nomic effect of all aspects of rate regulation in their financial sta-
tements and that any partial disallowance of costs associated with an 
operating asset should be written off. However, the specific require-
ments of SFAS 71 do not always reflect all of the economic effects of 
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regulation, such as not permitting costs not included in the rate base 
to be carried act discounted present value. Furthermore, SFAS 71 
refers to making an impairment evaluation in the same manner as nonre-
gulated enterprises. Accordingly, many believe that under existing 
literature the only sound basis for making an asset impairment eva-
luation relates to whether or not cost will be recovered. 
QUESTION 1: Should a partial disallowance of costs associated with an 
operating plant result in an immediate charge to expense? 
Conclusion of the Subcommittee 
The subcommittee has concluded, based on existing authoritative 
accounting literature, that the ability to recover the disallowed 
costs is the only factor to consider in determining whether an asset 
has been impaired. No consideration should be given to whether the 
asset will produce an equity return on investment. The subcommitee 
has concluded, therefore, that where a partial disallowance of costs 
associated with an operating plant will be recoverable using this 
standard, an immediate charge to expense is not permitted. A deter-
mination of whether costs incurred will be recovered in the rate-
making process must be made to determine the amount, if any, to be 
charged to expense. The asset impairment evaluation should be the 
same as for enterprises in general as required by paragraph 10 of SFAS 
71 . 
QUESTION 2: When a regulator disallows for rate-making purposes cer-
tain costs associated with an operating asset, what fac-
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tors should be considered in determining whether the value 
of the asset has been impaired? 
Conclusion of the Subcommittee 
As noted in the AICPA issues paper (Appendix B) , very few 
enterprises have written down operating assets to reflect an impair-
ment in value; hence, it is not entirely clear how impairment eva-
luations should be made under generally accepted accounting 
principles. 
The key element in determining whether there is an impairment is 
the factors considered in the measurement process. One view would be 
that the operating revenues less related expenses must be adequate to 
allow recovery of all costs associated with the plant (that is, must 
cover depreciation and related operating expenses). Another view 
would be that unless the discounted amount of future net cash inflows 
exceed the cost of the plant, there is an impairment. Related 
questions are whether expenses and cash outflow include interest, pre-
ferred stock dividends and/or return to common shareholders, and what 
discount rate, if any, should be used. 
The subcommittee has concluded that the measure of whether an 
asset has been impaired is whether net cash inflows (revenues less 
applicable expenses) are sufficient to cover the cost of the asset. 
In measuring expenses, interest applicable to the unit should be 
included, but equity return would not be included. Since income taxes 
are a function of income under generally accepted accounting prin-
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ciples, income taxes may not need to be considered in this calcula-
tion. However, where there will be income tax expense even with no 
equity return, such as where flow-through accounting was followed for 
capitalized overheads during the construction period and/or equity 
AFUDC is included in the disallowed plant cost, the cash flows for 
such income tax expense must be considered when measuring recoverabi-
lity. (If recoverability were to be measured by the discounted amount 
of future net cash inflows, a similar result may be achieved if 
interest expense were excluded and the discount rate was the weighted 
cost of debt.) 
It is also the conclusion of the subcommittee that the measure-
ment of revenues and expenses should be based on the smallest unit, 
generally a generating plant. 
Although it is not known whether enterprises in general consider 
interest costs in making an asset impairment evaluation, the subcom-
mittee believes that interest associated with a utility operating 
plant should be included because interest costs are specifically pro-
vided for in determining revenue in the rate-making process. 
Preferred stock dividends and return to common stockholders are 
also considered costs in the rate-making process for which revenue is 
specifically provided. However, such elements are not currently 
reflected as costs under generally accepted accounting principles in 
the income statement of regulated or nonregulated enterprises. The 
subcommittee recommends that the FASB consider whether equity is a 
cost which should be considered in making an impairment evaluation by 
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both regulated and nonregulated enterprises. If the FASB were to 
conclude that preferred stock dividends and/or return to common 
sharholders were costs that should be included in making an asset 
impairment evaluation, an immediate charge to expense of an amount 
up to the amount of the costs disallowed by a regulator would be 
required. 
QUESTION 3: Is an accounting entry required when a regulator issues a 
rate order that indicates a "penalty" related to excessive 
costs in constructing a plant is to be reflected by a 
reduced rate of return allowed on common equity, but does 
not quantify the amount of such penalty? If not, what 
disclosures, if any, are required in the notes to the 
finanical statements? 
Conclusion of the Subcommittee 
Paragraph 20 of SFAS 71 states that a regulator may permit an 
enterprise to amortize an allowable cost over a period of time for 
rate-making purposes that a nonregulated enterprises would charge to 
expense. If recovery of such major costs is provided without a return 
on investment during the recovery period, the enterprise shall 
disclose both the remaining amounts of such assets and the remaining 
recovery period applicable to them. 
Therefore, no accounting entry would be necessary if the regula-
tor reduces the rate of return since the amount of the "penalty" is 
not specifically identified and disallowed. However, the enterprise 
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should disclose the reduced rate of return, and whether it is expected 
to be a continuing reduction or only a one-time "penalty." 
The above conclusion of the subcommittee addresses the specific 
question but there are ramifications that deserve consideration. 
The nature of the "penalty" or "imprudence" disallowance should 
be considered. In practice, imprudence has a variety of meanings--
some commissions use it frequently; others limit its use to specific 
findings related to a specific situation. The question above appears 
to involve a case where there is a general finding of inefficiency in 
building plants rather than a specifically identified cost that is 
considered "imprudent." As stated above, SFAS 71 would not require a 
write-down of an asset although the rate of return adjustment should 
be disclosed. 
If, however, the disallowance were identified to a specific plant 
and cost, the question arises whether there has been, in fact, a 
disallowance of a specific asset disguised as a reduced rate of 
return. Issue I, question 2 discusses factors to be considered in eva-
luating whether a cost recovery is being accomplished by the regulator 
by permitting a higher than normal rate of return. The effects of the 
allowance of a lower than normal rate of return should be accounted 
for consistently. 
If it is determined that a specifically identified cost has been 
disallowed (in the form of a lower allowed return), then the 
evaluation of whether to charge to expense for an impairment is 
necessary and should be consistent with the subcommittee's views in 
Issue II, Questions 1 and 2. 
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QUESTION 4: Should AFUDC continue to be capitalized in situations 
where it is probable that there will be a future 
disallowance of costs associated with a plant that is 
expected to become operational in the future? 
Conclusion of the Subcommittee 
While SFAS 71 does not provide guidance as to when it is no 
longer appropriate to record AFUDC, the FASB in paragraphs 17 and 19 of 
SFAS 34 (as quoted under Issue I) did address the issue as it relates 
to capitalizing interest. 
If the capitalization of AFUDC were nothing more than interest 
capitalization in accordance with SFAS 34, capitalization would con-
tinue even in situations in which total cost recoverability was in 
doubt, as long as construction work was not suspended. However, 
because AFUDC includes an equity component, no authoritative 
accounting guidance exists. 
Extensive discussion surrounding the concept of AFUDC has 
occurred over many years. The FERC addressed this subject extensively 
and in 1977 issued Order 561 which outlines how AFUDC should be com-
puted. The FERC concluded that the concept of AFUDC capitalization 
was sound as it relates to regulated enterprises because it considers 
financing costs to comprise interest on short-term and long-term debt, 
preferred stock dividends, and return to common shareholders. As 
stated previously, all these elements are considered to be costs in 
establishing rates to be charged to customers. 
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The FASB's rationale in paragraph 15 of SFAS 71 for allowing the 
capitalization of AFUDC to include the equity component was that the 
amount so capitalized would be recovered through the rate-making pro-
cess. That being the case, continued capitalization of AFUDC may be 
deemed inappropriate by some in situations where a partial 
disallowance of cost associated with a future operative plant is 
expected to occur. Supporters of this view would require that capita-
lization of interest begin in accordance with the provisions of SFAS 
34. 
Some FASB members, as stated in paragraph 84 of SFAS 71, con-
sidered capitalized AFUDC to be an acceptable substitute for the 
amount of interest that would have been capitalized in accordance with 
SFAS 34. This view is shared by many individuals. Considering the 
weight the AFUDC calculation under FERC order 561 gives to short-term 
indebtedness, the concept that AFUDC approximates the amount of 
interest capitalized under SFAS 34 is logical. Using the rationale 
that AFUDC is a substitute for interest, all AFUDC should continue to 
be capitalized as provided for in paragraphs 17 and 19 of SFAS 34. 
It is noted that the FASB has not provided any specific guidance 
to assist regulated enterprises and auditors in responding to the 
question being asked above. The subcommittee believes, however, in 
the situation described above, that the company should make an 
assessment under the provisions of SFAS 5 to determine whether or not 
the plant in question has been impaired. The impairment valuation 
should be made using the criteria under Issue II, question 2. The 
costs to be compared with the future revenue stream should be the sum 
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of costs (including AFUDC) incurred to date plus estimated costs, 
including future AFUDC, to complete the project. The subcommittee 
believes that AFUDC should continue to be recorded regardless of the 
outcome of the assessment. It is noted that the current period 
impairment provision, if any, would include the effect of AFUDC to be 
capitalized in the future. 
If the regulator specifically orders the discountinuance of AFUDC 
capitalization, this would indicate impairment because recoverability 
of future AFUDC would be unlikely. Upon discontinuance of capita-
lizing AFUDC, interest costs should be capitalized pursuant to SFAS 34 
and an impairment evaluation made using interest costs rather than 
y  
AFUDC. 
QUESTION 5: What should the financial reporting to shareholders be 
when the FERC orders a write-off of amounts that would 
not be permitted to be written off under generally 
accepted accounting principles? 
Conclusion of the Subcommittee 
Financial reporting to shareholders must be in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles, and state accounting orders 
are not considered to provide, by themselves, accounting support under 
SFAS 71. However, consideration must be given to the authority of the 
FERC over reports to stockholders, as well as over reports to it. The 
FERC relies on the Appalachian case decision of 1962, which essentially 
said that the Federal Power Act of 1935 gave the FPC (FERC prede-
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cessor) the authority to require that its accounting requirements be 
reflected in its reports, including annual reports to stockholders. 
This would mean that if the FERC accounting requirements do not meet 
generally accepted accounting principles, the FERC requirements must 
be followed in annual reports to shareholders. (This requirement 
resulted in Montana Power Company's for many years presenting two sets 
of financial statements, one in accordance with generally accepted 
accouncing principles and one in accordance with the FERC rules.) 
There has been a belief by some that certain accounting authority 
of regulatory agencies was transferred to the SEC (which enforces 
generally accepted accounting principles) by the Railroad 
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Public Law 94-210, 
February 5, 1976 (4R Act). To the knowledge of the subcommittee, this 
question, as it concerns the FERC, has not been litigated. However, 
the following data extracted from a recent FERC order would indicate 
that the FERC position is that it still has primary accounting 
authority. 
The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (MDPU) had 
allowed the utility (Eastern) to restate its accumulated depreciation 
such that subsequent balance sheets have reflected an accumulated 
depreciation reserve that is S1.4 million lower than if the restate-
ment had not been made. 
In its order on accounting adjustment (issued July 5, 1984, 
Docket No. FA84-2-000), the FERC stated: 
We have reviewed the actions of the MDPU, and circumstances 
indicate that Eastern will likely recover the restated depre-
ciation amount through rate-making at the retail level. However, 
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as recognized by the courts, this Commission's accounting 
requirements take precedence over the actions of state regulators 
for books of account and published financial statements of utili-
ties subject to our jurisdiction. 5 
5/ In Appalachian Power Co. v. F.P.C., 328 F.2d 237, 246 
(4th Cir. 1964), the court stated: 
We agree with the Commission's determination that it, rather 
than state agencies, has the power to regulate the basic accounts 
which a company subject to its jurisdiction must use for finan-
cial reporting purposes. 
The court further cited the Supreme Court's findings in 
Northwestern Electric Co. v. F.P.C., 321 U.S. 119, 125 (1944), that 
state regulatory accounting actions are subordinate to Congress' 
appropriate exercise of the commerce power." 
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ISSUE III -- PHASE-IN PLANS 
Background 
Many electric utilities face the need for significant rate 
increases when major new generating stations are completed, especially 
nuclear fired generation. Such increases can increase base rates by 
30, 40, or 50 percent and even more in isolated cases. 
As a result of such dramatic increases, many electric utilities, 
regulator y commissions, and others have offered proposals to limit the 
amount of the rate increase allowed when new generating facilities go 
into service. Such proposals have been referred to as "rate modera-
tion" or "phase-in plans." 
The basic characteristic of these plans is to limit the amount of 
immediate rate increase that will be charged to consumers and defer 
for future recovery the difference between what would normally be 
charged and what is being charged. The methods of achieving this goal 
are quice varied. Some are quice simple, such as reducing the in-
service races for a period of time equal to the revenue that is 
generated during the construction period from having allowed 
construction work in progress (CWIP) in the rate base (various 
Connecticut decisions) . Others can be much more complex such as 
deferring amounts equal to the difference between the costs of 
generating power from the new plant compared to an estimate of costs 
if older oil and gas units had been used. Such deferrals might be 
continued for three or four years and then charged to customers over 
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some future period, like five years. In some cases, a return on the 
deferred amounts may be recovered currently, in others it may also be 
deferred (similar to proposals in Louisiana and California). 
A current proposal before the California Commission would use 
sinking fund depreciation and in addition defer for future recovery 
the inflation factor included in the rate of return normally granted 
on the investment in the new plant. Such a proposal, billed as econo-
mic depreciation, continues to capitalize additional costs for 
approximately nineteen years of a thirty-year plant life. The actual 
cash flow occurs in the last eleven years and the majority of that is 
in the last five years. 
Some rate moderation proposals (as in New Mexico and South 
Carolina) relate to the issue of the proper Level of generating capa-
city. In these cases a certain level of generating capacity 
(calculated at either average system cost or specific plant cost) is 
eliminated from the rate base, and carrying costs are deferred and reco-
vered over future periods. 
A number of proposed phase-in plans also include the deferral 
for rate purposes of part or all of an equity return on a plant going 
into service as a rate moderation technique. Such plans provide that 
the rate of return that would be allowed currently under conventional 
rate-making will be included in rates in future years, and accordingly, 
accounting orders may be forthcoming that provide for recording such 
amounts as deferred assets, with a credit to current income. This 
results in the same net income being reported as would be reported if 
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no phase-in plan was in effect, but revenues are less and therefore 
cash flow is negatively impacted. 
The capitalization (and credit to current income) of an equity 
return on plant not allowed currently in rate base as some phase-in 
plans suggest, occurs during operations not construction. and thus the 
Specific Standard in SFAS 71 concerning AFUDC does not establish an 
authoritative basis for such capitalization. 
Conventional generally accepted accounting principles contains no 
authoritative support for capitalizing an equity return (or equity 
cost of capital) during construction or operations. SFAS 34 specifi-
cally rejected the concept during construction because the Board did 
not believe it conformed to the present accounting framework. The 
question of capitalization during operations was not pursued. 
The problem with the present accounting framework (accounting 
model) is that the cost of using equity funds never appears as a cost 
in the income statement but is reflected as net income. Thus, to cre-
dit the income statement with an amount representing the cost of 
using equity funds results in a credit for which there is no debit in 
the body of the income statement. The use of borrowed funds presents 
no such dilemma because interest expense is recorded on the income sta-
tement as a cost, and the credit for use of borrowed capital during 
construction or operations offsets a cost that is recorded in the 
income statement. 
Paragraph 9 of SFAS 71 provides that regulators can provide 
reasonable assurance of the existence of an asset and an enterprise 
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shall, under appropriate circumstances, capitalize an incurred cost 
that would otherwise be charged to expense. An incurred cost is 
defined as "a cost arising from cash paid out or obligation to pay for 
an acquired asset or service, a loss from any cause that has been 
sustained and has been or must be paid for." The explanations in 
paragraphs 75 and 76 clearly indicate that paragraph 9 is referring to 
costs that would be charged to expense by an unregulated enterprise. 
While footnote 1 to SFAS 71 states that "the term allowable costs is 
used throughout this Statement to refer to all costs for which revenue 
is intended to provide recovery. . . including amounts provided for 
earnings on shareholders' investments," it is noteworthy that 
paragraph 9, which indicates that rate actions of a regulator can pro-
vide reasonable assurance of the existence of an asset, deals with 
incurred costs that would otherwise be charged to expense, not 
allowable costs. 
Since an equity rate of return on the rate base is not an "incurred 
cost that would otherwise be charged to expense" in accounting litera-
ture for nonregulated enterprises, paragraph 9 of the General 
Standards of SFAS 71 provides no authoritative support for capitaliza-
tion by reason of a regulator's action. 
Many point out that any cost item can be selected by a regulator 
for deferral in the rate-making process to accomplish a phase-in plan 
of rate increase. Hence, in their veiw the selection of equity costs 
or incurred costs for deferral by regulators is not a factor which 
should be important to accountants. The key factor is the probability 
of recovery of the amount which are deferred. 
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The probability of future recovery of costs is the generic issue 
to all questions in the accounting for utilities that are regulated on 
a specific cost of service basis. In SFAS 5, subparagraph 3(a), probable 
is defined as: "The future event or events are likely to occur." 
(emphasis added). Footnote 6 to SFAS 71 states: "The term probable is 
used in this Statement with its usual general meaning, rather than in 
a specific technical sense, and refers to that which can reasonably be 
expected or believed on the basis of available evidence or logic but 
is neither certain nor proved." Some have concluded there is a 
significant difference in these definitions; they concluded that the 
standard in SFAS 71 is much less demanding than the definition in SFAS 
5. They note a distinction between likely and probable. They conclude 
the definition in SFAS 71 means a 50/50 chance of occurrence. Others 
do not agree with such conclusions and believe the probability stan-
dard must be that the recovery is likely to occur. 
Another issue raised with regard to costs deferred in connection 
with phase-in plans relate to paragraph 27 of SFAS 71 . Some have 
concluded that if a regulator designates a cost for future recovery, it 
meets the definition of probable. Others believe that a regulatory 
statement in a rate order cannot, by itself, provide a basis for a 
conclusion of probable assurance of recovery. Such statements, by 
themselves, must be considered along with a variety of factors, such as 
the economics of the specific regulated industry, timing of recovery, 
the location of or future prospects of the specific enterprise, and 
the circumstances surrounding the event. 
As discussed in paragraphs 114 and 115 of SFAS 71, the FASB 
decided against a cookbook approach in categorizing types of evidence 
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required and the reliance placed on each. It is certainly recognized 
that it is impossible to eliminate the need for judgment in evaluating 
individual facts and circumstances. However, many believe that it is 
now necessary for the FASB to provide some additional guidance to 
ensure that conclusions reached in similar circumstances are the same. 
Because of the materialicy of the amounts involved with 
phase-in plans, the FERC is in the process of amending its Uniform 
System of Accounts to establish separate accounts to accommodate 
phase-in cost deferral accounting. It is noted that the FERC has the 
authority to control the form of reporting to the public and hence 
its consideration of this subject is important. 
There can be sound economic reasons for some phase-in proposals. 
There is some elasticity of demand in electric rates, and immediate 
rate increases of 30, 40, or 50 percent or more can prompt residencial 
customers to decrease their usage and cause industrial customers to 
change energy sources or move to another state. As a result, adequate 
revenue levels would not be achieved. While these economic reasons 
may be valid, the accounting questions generated by these proposals 
are significant. 
QUESTION 1: What factors should be considered in evaluating the proba-
bility of future recovery of deferred costs? 
Conclusion of the Subcommittee 
Future recovery of incurred costs under phase-in plans require an 
assessment of the probability of future recovery as discussed in 
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paragraph 9 of SFAS 71. The subcommittee believes the term probable, 
as it appears in SFAS 71 , should be redefined to be consistent with 
SFAS 5, 
The subcommittee believes that the following factors should be 
considered in evaluating the probability of future recovery of 
deferred costs. 
1. Time Horizon -- The probability of cost recovery requires an 
assessment of the future events. In general, the longer the 
delay in the start of the recovery period or the longer the 
time period for recovery, the less the chances are for reco-
very. For example, chances of recovery are better when a 
cost is deferred and recovered over a five year period that 
begins immediately, than when costs are deferred for five 
years and recovery begins thereafter. 
It is an accepted fact of regulation that the decisions of a 
presently constituted regulatory body cannot be binding on 
the future decisions of a regulatory body. This makes 
judgments of recoverability that are affected significantly 
by a long time period very difficult. 
The subcommittee believes that situations in which no cash 
recovery begins until after five years significantly 
decreases the probability of ultimate recovery. The subcom-
mittee suggests that the FASB consider whether it would be 
appropriate to establish a time frame limitation, although 
arbitrary, which could be used in assessing the probability 
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of recovery. Such a time frame restriction may also aid in 
the evaluation of other factors, such as future load growth, 
economics of the industry, and so forth. 
The subcommittee believes that the issuance of "subject to" 
opinions with respect to public utilities will be the norm 
rather than the exception unless additional guidelines 
relating to the accounting associated with recoverability of 
costs are established by the FASB. 
2. Economic Studies — The deferral of incurred costs for 
future recovery in the rate-making process should be econo-
mically justified. For example, deferral of costs may sti-
mulate increased short- and long-term load growth. In 
evaluating the probability of recovery, the subcommittee 
believes that there should be evidence that the regulators 
and utility officals developed economic projections that 
supported the economic basis for delaying the recovery of 
current costs and demonstrated that the costs deferred will 
be recovered from rate payers in the future. For instance, 
studies showing that future costs (per KWH/therm, etc.) will 
be increasing without including the deferred amounts may 
reduce the probability that total costs including those pre-
viously deferred, can be charged to rate payers in the 
future. In such situations, it would not seem logical to 
assume that future regulators would be any more prone to 
increasing rates further than would present regulators. In 
addition to assisting in a current evaluation of the proba-
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bility of future recovery of the deferred costs, such stu-
dies would also provide useful guidelines for making a 
continuing evaluation concerning the recovery of all cost 
deferrals. 
3. Regulatory Assurance -- In judging probability of cost reco-
very of deferred costs, the subcommittee believes that the 
regulators should recognize that the deferred amounts are 
costs that must be recovered in the future. Accordingly, a 
recovery plan for such deferred costs that does not require 
additional regulatory action may provide strong probability 
of cost recovery. On the other hand, a rate decision that 
does not specify the recovery plan or period for recovery of 
deferred costs would raise serious doubts about the probabi-
lity of recovery. An even more negative factor would be a 
regulatory statement that the regulatory commission would 
review the deferred costs in the future to determine 
whether, how, and when such costs are to be recovered. 
A listing summarizing some of the key factors that should be con-
sidered in evaluating the probability of recovery of cost deferrals is 
shown below: 
• Significance of amounts deferred 
• Length of deferral of cost period 
• Length of recovery period of costs deferred 
• Assurance of recovery of costs deferred (by statute, 
by commission order, or by stipulated assurance) 
• Recovery plan outlined in statute or commission order 
• Recovery period outlined in statute or commission order 
• Precedent (or lack thereof) by commission for 
frequently changing prior commission orders 
• Recovery contingent (or not contingent) on future 
events (such as load growth) 
• Utility is operating in an increasing cost environment 
(that is, future costs will increase significantly 
absent an additional phase-in plan in the future) vs. a 
stable or decreasing cost environment 
• Future plant additions will (or will not) require addi-
tional phase-in plans 
• Recovery of decommissioning costs (current recovery vs. 
minimal recovery vs. no recovery) 
• The performance of economic studies (or lack thereof) 
to demonstrate the reasonableness of the plan and cost 
recovery in the future 
The subcommittee believes that if the FASB established guideli-
nes, such as those presented above, it would be beneficial to the 
regulators , the regulated enterprises , and the accounting profession. 
Such guidelines should demonstrate that the substance of rate-making 
decisions must be taken into consideration in determining the 
appropriate accounting treatment to be followed. 
With the recognition that there maybe situations where phase-in, 
or rate moderation plans may be justified, and future recovery 
assured, the subcommittee emphasizes that such plans interject further 
arbitrary and political factors into the accounting process. The sub-
committee does not endorse the use of such plans to simply defer the 
recovery of costs when application of historical regulator y principles 
does not produce rate increases at levels that produce "rate shock" 
after taking into consideration the rate of inflation. 
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QUESTION 2: Can equity return on the rate base deferred under a phase-
in plan be established as an asset (deferred charge) , with 
a credit to current year's income, if it is probable that 
the regulator will permit recovery of that equity return 
in future years? 
Conclusion of the Subcommittee 
although SFAS 71 contains no specific 
standard for capitalizing or not 
capitalizing an allowance for funds 
used during operations 
The subcommittee believes that return on equity that would be 
earned currently, absent a phase-in plan, may be deferred as any other 
cost as provided in SFAS 71. 
QUESTION 3: Is it appropriate to capitalize carrying charges 
(calculated in the same manner as AFUDC) authorized 
by a regulatory authority on postponed costs 
(including a portion of an operating plant not 
allowed in rate base due to excess capacity) 
associated with a phase-in plan? 
Conclusion of the Subcommittee 
Subject to the subcommittee's reservations relating to deferring 
any costs, as previously stated, the subcommittee believes it is 
acceptable to defer such carrying costs assuming, of course, there is 
probability of recovery. 
QUESTION 4: How should deferred costs be classified in the balance 
sheet and the income statement, and what disclosures, if 
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any, should be made in the notes to the financial state-
ments? 
Conclusion of the Subcommittee 
The subcommittee believes that the notes to the financial state-
ments should disclose phase-in plans under consideration, expected 
to be proposed in the future, or presently in effect. Such disclo-
sures should include all significant details relating to the phase-in 
plan (that is, nature and magnitude of the costs to be deferred, 
length of recovery and deferral periods, cash flow implications, etc.) 
The FERC is undertaking currently a project to determine how 
phase-in plans should be disclosed in the balance sheet and income 
statement. Various alternatives exist with respect to such disclo-
sures, and interested parties will have an opportunity to respond to 
the FERC's preliminary views. 
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ISSUE IV — APPLICABILITY OF SFAS 71 IN PLANT PHASE-IN 
OR PARTIAL DISALLOWANCES OF COST SITUATIONS 
Background 
Paragraph 5 of SFAS 71 sets forth the criteria for determining 
whether SFAS 71 is applicable to an enterprise. The second criterion 
is that the regulated rates are designed to recover the specific 
enterprise's cost of providing the regulated services or products. 
Paragraph 65 of SFAS 71 discusses the cause-and-effect relationship 
between an enterprise's costs and its revenues (rates), which is 
required under paragraph 5. If the regulated rates are designed to 
recover the enterprise's cost, SFAS 71 would apply to the enterprise. 
As long as the regulated rates are based on the conventional 
accounting costs of the specific enterprise rather than on arbitrary 
rates or rates based on all companies in the industry or on some 
regional basis, SFAS 71 would continue to apply to the enterprise. 
The disallowance of incurred costs by regulators from recovery 
through rates has always occurred in practice. However, the magnitude 
of potential disallowances is currently much greater. A disallowance 
does not, by itself, eliminate the cause and effect relationship 
addressed in SFAS 71 . Cost-based rate-making concepts have never 
guaranteed the recovery of all costs. For example, the disallowance 
by a regulator of a portion of a company aircraft from inclusion in 
rate base and/or the exclusion of associated expenses from cost of 
service recovery would not necessarily eliminate the cause-and-effect 
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relationship of costs and revenues for the enterprise as a whole. 
Further, SFAS 71 does not require costs to be collected currently, 
provided there is reasonable assurance that the costs will be 
collected in the future. 
The third criterion requires consideration of anticipated changes 
in levels of demand or competition during the recovery period for any 
capitalized costs to determine if it is reasonable to assume that the 
established rates can be charged to and collected from customers. 
Paragraph 66 of SFAS 71 concludes that regardless of the actions of a 
regulator, if the market for the regulated services will not support a 
rate based on cost, then the statement would not apply to such regu-
lated operations. In practice this evaluation is extremely difficult 
to do. Furthermore, no guidelines have been set forth by the FASB. 
In paragraph 67, the FASB explains that it does not intend that 
the enterprise earn a fair return on shareholders' investment under 
all conditions. Accordingly, the inability to earn a fair rate of 
return on equity is not necessarily a determination that costs are not 
being recovered sufficiently for SFAS 71 to continue to apply. It is 
noted that most utilities do not actually earn the rate of return 
granted in rate cases. 
The third criterion also requires reasonable assurance that the 
regulated environment and its economic effects will continue. 
Paragraph 68 discusses circumstances that must be evaluated in deter-
mining the probability of recovery. For example, if the enterprise 
has an exclusive franchise, there is usually a reasonable expectation 
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that the regulated environment and its economic effects will continue. 
Paragraph 69 addresses the concern that rates set at levels that will 
recover the enterprise's costs can be charged to and collected from 
customers in light of the recent changes in the regulatory environ-
ment. It states that it may not be reasonable to expect that rates 
established to recover cost can be charged and collected under such 
conditions. Obviously, elasticity of customer demand, monopoly impli-
cations, general economic conditions, changes in style and degree of 
regulation, and the political outlook are factors to be considered in 
assessing existing and future competition. The Board concluded that 
users of financial statements should be aware of the possibility of 
rapid unanticipated changes in an industry but accounting should not 
be based on such possibilities unless their occurance is probable. 
However, changes of a long-term nature could modify the demand for an 
enterprise's regulated services sufficiently to affect its qualifying 
under the criterion of subparagraph 5(c). 
The current political and economic environment in many regulated 
industries is toward increased competition and deregulation. 
Furthermore, the regulatory environment that exists presently has 
changed from that in existence at the time the FASB undertook the 
writing of SFAS 71, primarily because costs have increased faster than 
inflation. The evolving customer expectations, the role of govern-
ment, the media, and market conditions have become much more impor-
tant. Resistence to rate increases comes from political pressures, 
consumer advocates, and industry groups. While these are not new fac-
tors to the rate regulation scene, their role has intensified 
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resulting in increased pressure on regulators to limit rate increases 
through any means possible. When rate increase limitations or other 
cost avoidance schemes reach the point that it is no longer possible 
to identify a cause-and-effect relationship of costs and revenues, 
then cost-based rate-making ceases to exist and defacto deregulation is 
present. 
There are differing views as to when an enterprise does not meet 
the criteria of subparagraphs 5(b) and 5(c) of SFAS 71. 
At one end of the spectrum is the view that under the regulatory 
environment that currently exists in some jurisdictions, probability 
of cost recovery cannot be determined because regulators refuse to 
grant any assurances, and franchises that effectively preclude com-
petition in reality do not exist. Further, those who take that view 
state that cost recovery requires that the demand for regulated ser-
vices be insensitive to price (inelastic), that is, regardless of the 
change in price, demand will not change significantly. Accordingly, 
proponents of such a view would likely conclude that the mere 
existence of any rate moderation plan, such as a plant phase-in, is 
sufficient evidence to conclude that demand is price sensitive and, 
therefore, implementation of such programs by regulators would 
preclude the applicability of SFAS 71 to the enterprise. 
At the other end of the spectrum is the view that a regulated 
utility that meets the criteria of subparagraph 5(a) and 5(b) will 
always meet the third criterion over the long run, because the regu-
lated enterprise's cost, including a fair rate of return must be reco-
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vered. under current law. It is assumed that regulators will maintain 
a balance between the interests of customers and shareholders over the 
long run. 
Another view between the two ends of the spectrum is that when it 
is deemed probable that over the long run rates cannot be charged and 
collected because of demand and the level of competition, regardless 
of the actions of the regulator, and that the resultant cause-and-
effect relationship of costs and rates no longer exists, the 
enterprise is operating in an environment of defacto deregulation and 
SFAS 71 would no longer apply to such an enterprise. 
Determining the point at which the enterprise reaches the con-
dition of defacto deregulation is a significant and difficult deter-
mination and the FASB has not provided any substantive guidance. Rate 
regulation that is deemed to be undesirable does not by itself give 
rise to long term and relatively permanent conditions necessary to 
conclude that SFAS 71 would no longer be applicable to an enterprise. 
In evaluating demand and the level of competition under subparagraph 
5(c), the availability of alternative supplies, sources, or types of 
energy, each at competitive prices, normally would be considered. 
Under this view, the short-term or one time suppression of rates by 
regulators due to political or other pressures is not necessarily a 
true factor of competition or the loss of the cause-and-ef fect rela-
tionship of cost and revenues for the enterprise as a whole. 
QUESTION 1: Does a partial disallowance by a regulator of the cost of 
an operating plant provide persuasive evidence that SFAS 
71 is no longer applicable to that utility? 
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Conclusion of the Subcommittee 
The subcommittee believes that based upon the criteria set forth 
in paragraph 5 of SFAS 71 , a disallowance by a regulator of costs 
associated with an operating plant generally would not provide conclu-
sive evidence that SFAS 71 does not apply. If rates continue to be 
based on the specific enterprise's costs and a cause and effect rela-
tionship between costs and revenues continues to exist for the 
enterprise, SFAS 71 would continue to apply to the enterprise. 
Even assuming the partial disallowance of the cost of an operating 
plant results in a write-off as a result of an impairment evaluation, 
such a disallowance and write-off would not necessarily change the 
long-term applicability of SFAS 71 to the enterprise. Each situation 
would require a careful evaluation to determine the continued applica-
bility of SFAS 71. 
QUESTION 2: Does implementation of a phase-in plan provide persuasive 
evidence that SFAS 71 is not applicable to that utility? 
Conclusion of the Subcommittee 
The implementation of a phase-in plan does not in itself provide 
persuasive evidence that SFAS 71 is not applicable to the regulated 
operations of an enterprise. The facts and circumstances of the phase-
in plan must be compared to the criteria set forth in paragraph 5. 
If any one of the three criteria is not met, then SFAS 71 would no 
longer be applicable. 
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Although the existence of a phase-in plan may not provide per-
suasive evidence that SFAS 71 no longer applies, the examination and 
evaluation of the elements of the phase-in plan could change that 
conclusion. An examination of the phase-in plan may indicate that 
it is not probable that the rates under the phase-in plan for the 
regulated services will ever be allowed to be charged and collected 
from customers because the market will not support such rates. Such 
market conditions could alter the enterprise's long-term regulated 
environment sufficiently to prevent it from meeting the criteria set 
forth in subparagraph 5(c). These long-term conditions would need to 
establish the existence of defacto deregulation of the enterprise as a 
whole. 
Absent any offsetting factors, examples of a phase-in plan that 
could lead to the conclusion that reasonable assurance of cost reco-
very for the regulated operations as a whole does not exist are as 
follows: 
• The plan pertains to a significant portion of the 
enterprise's costs. 
• Recovery is contingent upon certain future events, such as 
load growth. 
• Deferral periods are long. 
• The regulator has precluded recovery of other jurisdictional 
costs. 
• The regulator has not promised to allow specific cost reco-
very over a specific period. 
• An evaluation of market and demand conditions during the 
recovery period and a determination as to whether the deferred 
costs could be reasonably expected to be recovered under the 
conditions that would exist during the recovery period has 
not been made. 
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While a phase-in plan may preclude the deferral of the costs of a 
particular plant under paragraph 9 of SFAS 71, other conditions appli-
cable to the regulated operations as a whole may still meet the cri-
teria of subparagraphs 5(b) and 5(c). Making the determination as to 
when the enterprise is operating in a deregulated environment in which 
the relationship between costs and revenues no longer exist is a dif-
ficult determination. 
As long as it is probable that future cost increases, including 
those associated with a phase-in plan, will be recovered through 
future revenues, SFAS 71 will continue to apply. 
QUESTION 3: If it is concluded that SFAS 71 is no longer applicable, 
how should a utility make the transition from a regulated 
enterprise to a nonregulated enterprise for financial 
accounting and reporting purposes? 
Conclusion of the Subcommittee 
APB Opinion 20, Accounting Changes, specifies how accounting 
changes will be reported based on what type of change occurs. That 
pronouncement defines three types of accounting changes: (1) change 
in accounting principle, (2) change in accounting estimate, and (3) 
change in reporting entity. The question arises as to which, if any, 
of the three categories fits a transition from a regulated to a nonre-
gulated enterprise for financial accounting and reporting purposes. 
Based on the definitions in APB Opinion 20, such a transition would 
not be a change in reporting entity, although it is a change from 
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being a regulated entity to a nonregulated entity. Such a change 
would require the entity to adopt conventional generally accepted 
accounting principles that it would have been following absent the 
impact of rate-regulation. 
It might also be argued that the change resulted from the 
recognition of events or transactions occurring for the first time 
and, therefore, would be classified under APB Opinion 20 as a change 
in accounting estimate to be accounted for on a prospective basis. 
It might also be argued that it is a change in accounting prin-
ciples resulting from adoption of a generally accepted accounting 
principle different from the one used previously. However, the adop-
tion of SFAS 71 or the discontinuance of reporting under SFAS 71 is, 
in the opinion of many, much more substantive than merely a change in 
an accounting principle. If it is considered a change in accounting 
principle, it is certainly pervasive, as it establishes the basis for 
following the specific accounting principles used in establishing 
rates. Furthermore, a change in accounting principle, as defined in 
AP3 Opinion 20, relates to situations where there is a choice between 
acceptable principles. 
Paragraph 22 of SFAS 71 addresses the question of adoption of the 
provisions of SFAS 71. However, SFAS 71 does not address the question 
of discontinuing reporting under SFAS 71 when the criteria set forth 
in paragraph 5 are no longer met. 
When discontinuing reporting under SFAS 71 , there is a need to 
evaluate certain accounting principles followed that would not be 
generally accepted accounting principles absent SFAS 71 justification. 
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Since neither APB Opinion 20 nor SFAS 71 deals specifically with 
a change from an enterprise reporting to reflect the impact of rate 
regulation to a conventional generally accepted accounting principles 
basis, the subcommittee believes the FASB should address the manner in 
which such a change should be reported. The subcommittee believes it 
is essential that neither retroactive reporting nor pro forma disclo-
sure of the effect on prior years be considered because the previous 
financial statements appropriately reflect the impact of rate regula-
tion. 
The subcommittee believes that discontinuing reporting under SFAS 
71 results from a change in events and circumstances (accounting esti-
mate) in which a cumulative effect adjustment would, under APB 
Opinion 20, be recorded in the year of transition to reflect the eli-
mination of the effect of regulators actions that are no longer appli-
cable. The subcommittee further believes that the cumulative effect 
should 
adjustment would be reported as an extraordinary item under the broad 
concepts provided in APB Opinion 30, Reporting the Results of 
Operations. However, such a presentation should not be construed as 
precluding the entity from converting to reporting under SFAS 71 at 
some future date when events and circumstances change and the entity 
again meets the criteria of paragraph 5 of SFAS 71. 
Examples of items which were appropriately reflected or not 
reflected in. the balance sheet at the date of the change by reason of 
past rate regulatory treatment which will need to be reconsidered at 
the date of the change as to their appropriateness under generally 
accepted accounting principles for nonregulated enterprises are as 
follows: 
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• The equity portion of AFUDC remaining in the undepreciated 
property balance to the extent that it exceeds interest that 
would have been capitalized under SFAS 34 
• Intercompany profit not eliminated 
• Any deferred income taxes not provided for in the past 
because the utility was all or partially on a flow 
through basis for rate regulation purposes 
• Unamortized balances of regulation created assets deferred 
pursuant to paragraph 9 of SFAS 71 (such as plant abandon-
ment losses, "excess" purchased power costs, "abnormal" 
maintenance) 
• Unamortized gains or losses on early extinguishment of debt 
that is amortized in accordance with regulatory treatment 
• Revenues billed but deferred on the balance sheet pursuant 
to subparagraph 11(b) of SFAS 71 because the rates were intended 
to recover costs that are expected to be incurred in the 
future 
• Deferred charges or deferred credits to reflect automatic 
fuel clause recovery mechanisms 
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SUBCOMMITTEE BALLOT ON CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS PRESENTED IN ISSUES PAPER 
APPLICATION OF CONCEPTS IN FASB STATEMENT OF 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 71 
TO EMERGING ISSUES IN THE PUBLIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 
Approve Disapprove Abstain 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
o Discounted Present Value 10 
o Equity Has A Cost 8 
o Definition of Probable 11 
o Criteria for Evaluating Cost 
Recovery 11 
o Deferral of an Equity Return 11_ 
o Criteria for Continued 
Capitalization of AFUDC 11_ 
o Transition Guidelines 11 
o Accounting for Nuclear Plant 
Decommissioning Costs 11 
Issue I - Plant Abandonments 
o Question 1 10 
o Question 2 11 
o Question 3 10 
o Question 4 11 
o Question 5 11 
Issue II - Disallowance of a Portion 
of Costs Associated with an 
Operating Plant 
o Question 1 10 
o Question 2 9 
o Question 3 10 
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0 1__ 
1 2_ 
0 0_ 
0 0_ 
0 0_ 
0 0_ 
0 0_ 
0 0_ 
0 1_ 
0 0_ 
0 
0 0_ 
0 0_ 
1 0_ 
2 0_ 
1 0_ 
Subcommittee Ballot Page 2 
Approve Disapprove Abstain 
o Question 4 10 1 0 
o Question 5 10 0 1 
Issue III - Phase-In Plans 
o Question 1 9 1 1 
o Question 2 110 0 
o Question 3 11 
o Question 4 11 
Issue IV - Applicability of SFAS 71 
ih Plant Phase-In or Partial 
Disallowance of Cost Situations 
o Question 1 11 
o Question 2 11 
o Question 3 10 
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_0 0_ 
_0 0__ 
0 1 
AICPA American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
November 7, 1984 
Mr. James J. Leisenring 
Director of Research and 
Technical Activities 
Financial Accounting 
Standards Board 
High Ridge Park 
Stamford, CT 06905 
Dear Jim: 
Enclosed are 15 copies of an issues paper, "Applica-
tion of Concepts in FASB Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 71 to Emerging Issues in the Public Utility 
Industry." It was prepared by the AICPA's Public Utilities 
Subcommittee (subcommittee) in response to an inquiry made 
by the staff of the FASB. 
The Accounting Standards Executive Committee (AcSEC) 
discussed the paper at its meeting on November 1, 1984. 
Because the FASB staff would like to receive the paper as 
soon as possible, AcSEC did not perform an indepth review 
of the issues and conclusions contained in the paper and 
therefore, has taken no position on them. However, AcSEC 
does believe after discussions with members of the subcom-
mittee and the staff of the FASB that all issues contained 
in the paper should be considered by the FASB when it reviews 
SFAS 71. 
If you should require any additional information or 
assistance in this project, please contact me. 
Sincerely, 
Roger Cason 
Chairman 
AICPA Accounting Standards 
Executive Committee 
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